Introduction
The Great Migration of African Americans out of the South is commonly believed to have begun in the 1910s. And the usual explanation is that it was a response to political repression in the South and booming labor markets in the North. However, both of these conditions had been present for several decades before then. As comprehensively demonstrated by Robert Margo (2004) , after having been comparable in the antebellum period, wages in the South fell, relative to the North, after the Civil War ended in 1865 and the gap remained for the rest of nineteenth century. And Volume XXXVII, 2019 as described by Rayford Logan (1997) , political repression of African Americans returned with the end of Reconstruction in the 1870s, increasing thereafter. This raises the question as to why the Great Migration did not happen earlier.
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William Collins (1997) and Trevon Logan (2009) have offered two possible explanations. Collins argues that the Great Migration was delayed by large scale European migration and the preference for European immigrants over African Americans. The Great Migration, therefore, only began when European migration was restricted. Logan argues the Great Migration was delayed by the illiteracy and poor health of emancipated slaves. It could only begin with the healthier, more literate, next generation of African Americans.
One set of actors that could have assisted an earlier Great Migration were the emigrant agents. They operated within the South to match African American workers with potential out-of-state employers. However, as described by David Bernstein (1998) , in some states they were prohibited by state laws. The emigration agent laws were part of a range of legislation that restricted the economic activities of African Americans, complementing restrictions on other activities.
In this paper, we provide the first estimates of the size of the effect of emigrant agents on the interstate migration of African Americans. We take advantage of two quasi-natural experiments that occurred between 1870 and 1900 in four Southern States: Alabama, Georgia, and the Carolinas. Emigrant agents were outlawed in Georgia from 1876 and, from 1891, South Carolina. Alabama and North Carolina also introduced emigrant agent laws in 1877 and 1889 but these were shortly thereafter ruled unconstitutional by the State Supreme Courts. The treatment effects of the laws are estimated from a sample of African American men from the four states in the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) dataset of linked individuals between the 1870 and 1880 and the 1880 and 1900 censuses.
We find no indication that the emigrant agent laws reduced migration from Georgia relative to Alabama. Although the estimated treatment effect for South Carolina relative to North Carolina is negative, the effect is not statistically significant. This result is consistent with the emigrant agent laws not being a major factor in delaying the Great Migration. Any effects might have been too small to separately detect econometrically from other legal and extra-legal efforts in place across all the states to prevent large scale emigration. Alternatively, the laws could have been ineffective because of the demand and supply factors highlighted by Collins (1997) and Logan (2009) .
The paper is structured in the following way. In the next section we present a simple economic analysis of the emigrant agent laws. This is followed by the historical background required for the empirical analysis. We then present the econometric model and data and discuss the identification strategy. We then report the results and conclude.
An Economic Analysis of Emigrant Agent Laws
As the emigrant agent laws ultimately target the decision to migrate, we begin with a standard model of individual migration. The location decision for an individual is modeled as a discrete choice problem. Each individual chooses which location j out of a set of possible locations, J, they will live and work in. The set J includes both where they start and all possible states and counties they could live in. The utility each individual gets from living in location j is Uj. Uj is a function of the characteristics of the location and the individual. It includes the wages the individual receives over time as well as social and political factors. If the individual chooses to move from location j to location k, a moving cost of Tjk is incurred.
The migration decision is modeled as one made under uncertainty as in the postbellum US it is unlikely that individuals have perfect information about the utilities in each location or the moving costs. 1 We assume that individuals are risk averse. In addition, we assume individuals are subject to credit constraints as this was likely to be the case for African Americans from the South.
Hence the individual ranks all possible locations on the basis of their expected utilities and chooses the most preferable. If the individual starts Volume XXXVII, 2019 from location j location k will be chosen if the expected utility, net of moving costs, of moving to location k is greater than that of staying in j or moving to any other location, that is if
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where B represents the information held by the individual and Tjj = 0.
Within this framework, introducing emigrant agents can result in more individuals migrating interstate for two sets of reasons. First, the emigrant agent can provide new information on the characteristics of interstate location k (including wages) and the costs of moving there such that the expected utility in an interstate location exceeds the starting and other intrastate locations. This is represented by changing the information set, B, and the associated probabilities assigned to each potential outcome.
Second, the emigrant agent can also facilitate credit to assist with the move, as represented by a change in Tjk. Again, this can result in an interstate location(s) being ranked above the starting and other intrastate locations. Hence, we expect states in which emigrant agents operate to have higher interstate migration rates compared with states without them, all else being equal. Similarly, individuals are less likely to migrate within a state because the expected returns to interstate migration have increased relative to those from intrastate migration.
Emigrant Agents
Emigrant agents were hired by employers to recruit African Americans from the eastern southern states and to assist their move to the western southern (and, to a lesser extent, northern) states to work for them.
2 Emigrant agents had been used by employers in the North as far back as the 1850s to find workers (Rosenbloom 2002, 48) , but, as argued 2 The literature also refers to emigrant agents as labor agents. We use the term emigrant agent to highlight that they encouraged migration as this was the aspect of their activity regulated by the emigrant agent laws. Even the Mississippi state government established an official bureau of emigration which sent emigrant agents into Alabama to recruit African American workers as described by Jonathan Weiner in Weiner (1978, 60) .
by William Cohen (1991, 110) , they only began operating in the South during Reconstruction.
The literature features several case studies of African American migration in which emigrant agents play a prominent role. Cohen (1991) discusses emigrant agents in his detailed account of the geographic mobility of African Americans in the postbellum South. More specifically, emigrant agents played a role in the migration that occurred between 1865 and the mid-1870s of African Americans from South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi westwards to Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas, encouraged by land speculators and railroad companies (for example, William Scroggs 1917 , 1035 Carter Woodson 1918, 120) . For example, the Atlanta Sunday Herald reports (February 8, 1874, p. 4 
):
The hegira westward has again set in, and almost every day greater or less numbers of our black farming population are passing through here and other Georgia cities bound for Louisiana, Arkansas, or other Western States. This tide is to some extent, no doubt, caused by misrepresentations and fair promises of emigrant agents, who ply assiduously their vocation for the pay there is in it. Another reason for the outflow is owing to partial crop failures in some counties of the State, and the slim prospect for finding a support during the coming spring and summer.
In addition, Ronald Lewis (1989) describes the role of emigrant agents working on behalf of the coal companies in the migration of southern African Americans to the central Appalachian coalfields from 1880 to the early 1920s. William Holmes (1980) attributes the mass migration of African Americans from Morgan County, Georgia, between November 1899 and January 1900 to emigrant agents who persuaded African Americans about better working conditions elsewhere and then paid their train fare. Finally, Frenise Logan (1956) describes the belief of North Carolina whites that emigrant agents were responsible for the outmigration of African Americans from North Carolina during the late nineteenth century.
These case studies illustrate how emigrant agents could assist African Americans to overcome two constraints on their ability to move: lack of Essays in Economic & Business History Volume XXXVII, 2019 information about opportunities elsewhere and lack of credit to cover the costs of migration.
Emigrant agents could also improve the bargaining powers of African Americans who remained in their home state. For example, one emigrant agent, Robert "Peg Leg" Williams, was so successful in recruiting African Americans from North Carolina that the workers who remained broke contracts and made greater demands to their existing employers (Cohen 1991, 266) . Although Williams agreed not to recruit African American workers on contracts, some planters still found that their best African American tenants also left or demanded higher wages and lower rents (Holmes 1980, 441) .
Emigrant Agent Laws
The emigrant agent laws, passed in the four states in two stages between 1876 and 1891, required emigrant agents to obtain a license and pay the usually punitive license fee specified in the statute in order to operate. These laws were aimed at restricting interstate migration by African Americans.
The origin of the first emigrant laws probably lies in the combination of the continuing effects of the Panic of 1873 and the end of Reconstruction. The end of Reconstruction resulted in the election of governments more responsive to planter interests and deteriorating social conditions for African Americans. This, in combination with poor economic conditions, probably encouraged greater interest in interstate migration. Emigrant agent laws were part of a set of laws, sometimes originating in the pre-Reconstruction Black Codes, restricting economic and other activities of African Americans (Bernstein 1998, 790; Cohen 1991, 30) .
Although written in race-neutral terms, the laws were aimed at restricting African American migration (Cohen 1991, 234-235) . When the state of Alabama attempted to defend its laws in court, the link to African American migration to Kansas and aim of restricting the migration of agricultural workers was acknowledged (Bernstein 1998, 796) . In North Carolina the law was designed to restrict agents from operating in counties with substantial African American populations (Cohen 1991, 235) . The timing of the emigrant agent laws in the four states that implemented them before 1900 is presented in Table 1 . Cohen (1991) ; Logan (1964) .
The first resolutions considered by a state parliament for controlling emigrant agents were in 1870 in Virginia, though these were not passed (Cohen 1991, 232) . The first wave of emigration agent laws occurred in the mid-1870s following the election of Democrat state governments. After an unsuccessful attempt in 1873, in 1876 Georgia's legislature passed legislation setting a license fee of $100 per county that the emigrant agent wanted to operate in. The legislature increased the fee to $500 per county in 1877 (Bernstein 1998) .
Similarly, demand for emigrant laws began in Alabama in 1874 (Cohen 1991, 232 ) with a law finally being passed in January 1877. It introduced a license fee of $100 per county for emigrant agents but only in Black Belt counties specified in the legislation (Bernstein 1998, 795) . Between 1879 and 1880 Alabama's legislature increased the license fee to $250 per county and added more counties where emigrant agents were required to hold a license (Bernstein 1998, 796) . Agents caught working without a license could be fined and/or imprisoned (Lewis 1989, 83) .
The size of the license fees, unrelated to the cost of regulating the occupation, suggests the legislatures intended to prevent emigrant agents from working. For example, Georgia's $500 emigrant agent license fee in 1877, applied to each county the agent wanted to operate in, was more than 2.5 times the national per capita nominal income of $194. 3 The prohibitive nature of the emigrant agent laws is further demonstrated by the absence of standard requirements for occupational licensing outlined by Morris Kleiner, such as requiring proof of competency and a licensing board (Kleiner 2000, 191) . North Carolina also unsuccessfully attempted to tax emigrant agents in January 1881, the law being passed in the upper but not in the lower house. 4 This followed large scale migration to Indiana in the late 1870s (Logan 1964, 123) . North Carolina finally passed an emigrant agent law in 1891. This followed the large scale migration of African Americans in response to the passing of a restrictive election law there in 1889. The emigrant agent law only applied to a set of counties with substantial African American populations and it required agents to pay a license fee of $1,000 per county operated in (Logan 1964 ). An emigrant agent law was also passed in South Carolina in 1891, but this applied to all counties (Cohen 1991, 235) . It also set a license fee of $1,000 per county initially. However, this was reduced in 1893 to $500 per county.
It is not surprising that emigrant agents operating in various southern states challenged these laws in the courts. As described in Bernstein (1998) , in the 1882 Alabama state Supreme Court case Joseph v Randolph the presiding judge determined that the legislative intent of the emigrant agent law was to prevent workers from leaving the state through an indirect tax on the emigrant agent and, therefore, the law violated the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and was void. As there is nothing specific to Alabama in the reasoning that led to the judge overturning the law, the decision appears to be exogenous to characteristics of the state and workers.
In Georgia the emigrant agent law was also challenged but this was unsuccessful (see the 1877 Georgia state Supreme court's ruling in Shepperd v County Commissioner). Hence, while from 1880 emigrant agents were largely taxed out of existence in Georgia, in Alabama they were permitted to operate without having to pay prohibitive license fees. This provides a natural experiment for the evaluation of the effects of the emigrant agent laws on African American migration.
A second natural experiment arises from the different experiences in the second wave of emigration agent laws of North and South Carolina. In North Carolina the emigrant agent law was challenged and determined to be unconstitutional in 1893 for two reasons. First, because it was a tax that was applied selectively to certain counties. Secondly, because, as the court argued, of the "unreasonableness of the license fee" (Logan 1964, 134-135) . The second reason is not specific to North Carolina.
The South Carolina law was not challenged, but in 1896 and 1897 there were two attempts to repeal the Act. The first passed the House before being defeated in the Senate (Watchman and Southron, February 12, 1896), whereas the second attempt, by a different member of the house, did not pass the House (Abbeville Press and Banner, February 10, 1897) . This suggests that the successful appeal in North Carolina was an exogenous event.
The argument that the laws and court decisions in the four states provide a set of natural experiments is strengthened by the response of Alabama and North Carolina when a US Supreme Court decision ruled the emigrant agent laws were constitutional. In 1900 a challenge to the emigrant agent laws in Georgia by the emigrant agent Williams [Williams v Fears (Georgia, 1900) ] went to the U.S. Supreme Court. The presiding judge ruled the emigrant agent law taxed only the occupation of hiring labourers for work outside the state, but did not prohibit workers from freely moving about and entering into contracts. Therefore, the emigrant agent law did not contravene the fourteenth amendment and was legal.
This set a precedent for other judges in similar cases. For instance, the presiding judge in Kendrick v the State (Alabama, 1904) did not believe he needed to make a judgment on whether the emigrant agent law was in contravention of the United States Constitution as that matter was already determined by the United States Supreme Court in Williams v Fears. According to Bernstein (1998, 820) and Cohen (1991, 238) , following Williams' unsuccessful challenge, Alabama and North Carolina quickly re-introduced their emigrant agent laws. This suggests that Alabama and North Carolina would have had emigrant agent laws like Georgia and South Carolina but could not until the precedents set by the 1882 and 1893 state court rulings were overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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How Effective Were the Emigration Agent Laws?
No study has previously attempted to directly estimate the effectiveness of the emigrant agent laws. Hence, their effectiveness remains an open empirical question. Bernstein (1998, 821-822) believes the laws reduced the rate of out-migration by raising the cost of migration, although he does acknowledge that African American migration within and from the South occurred in spite of emigrant agent laws. There are examples in the historical literature of the laws having the desired effects. Lewis (1989, 83) reports an Appalachian coal company emigrant agent left the profession because it had become too dangerous to work without a license. During the late nineteenth century a female emigrant agent, who refused to purchase a license, eventually stopped working after a $50 fine was imposed for working without a license (Holmes 1980, 439) .
In contrast, Leo Alilunas (1937, 162) doubts that emigrant agent laws reduced out-migration, particularly to the North, because there were other stimuli to migrate, like the press and letters received from family and/or friends who had already migrated to the North. In addition, Alilunas (1937, 162) believes that some emigrant agents simply refused to comply, resorting "to secretive tactics in their process of recruiting Negro labor." Similarly, Robert Higgs (1977, 75) also considers that the law appeared "to have had little effect beyond driving the agents underground." Though neither Alilunas nor Higgs elaborate on how unlicensed emigrant agents operated.
In addition, as highlighted in the literature on the Great Migration, there may have been neither the demand for large scale migration of African Americans from the South or a supply of southern African Americans able to migrate. Collins (1997) provides the most systematic treatment of why Northern employers did not demand African American workers despite a booming manufacturing sector. He argues that the migration north was delayed due to the high levels of foreign immigration prior to World War One. Foreign immigration deterred African Americans from migrating because of increased competition for high wage manufacturing jobs in the North, which, combined with employers' preference for white foreign workers over African American workers, reduced the expected wage of potential African American migrants (Collins 1997, 617 ). An empirical analysis of census data for the northern states from 1870 to 1950 shows an inverse relationship between African American migration and foreign immigration. Collins (1997) finds a significant and positive relationship between African American migration and variables controlling for economic incentives, like manufacturing, employment growth and the relative wage (Collins 1997, 621) . He estimates that in the state of New York, which received 1.2 million foreign-born migrants between 1900 and 1910, foreign immigration crowded out 100,000 potential African American migrants. This contrasts with the 40,000 African Americans who actually migrated to New York in that period.
This argument is consistent with other evidence of generally low demand for African Americans by northern employers. Cohen (1991) argues that northern employers offered relatively low wages to African Americans. For example, African Americans were offered eight dollars per month and board for work constructing a railroad from Detroit to Lansing (Cohen 1991, 84-85) , whereas a North Carolina railroad company offered $20 per month with rations or one dollar per day without rations (Cohen 1991, 110) .
Alternatively, even if there was a potential demand for African American workers in the North, African Americans were, in the main, not prepared to immediately participate in an inter-regional labor market. Illiteracy, poverty, and the legacy of slavery made migration difficult for many African Americans.
Based on individual level econometric analysis Richard Vedder et al. (1986) highlight that the preference of earlier generations of southern-born African Americans for the southern environment, especially for the climate, delayed their migration to the North and made migration within the South more attractive. Further, they speculate that those born into slavery did not have the time or resources to become educated and to accumulate wealth and were so grateful for their freedom that they were not "inclined to engage in risky acts of migration" (Vedder et al. 1986, 228) . In contrast, African Americans born in the South after the Civil War had time to gain education and money to migrate. Not experiencing life in bondage, this generation of southern-born African Americans would not have tolerated the poor economic conditions and the racial discrimination of the South and were more inclined to respond to these factors by migrating (Vedder et al. 1986, 228) .
More recently, Logan (2009) documents low literacy rates and poor health in the postbellum generation of African Americans. As a result of low literacy rates, African Americans were at a disadvantage in locating better employment opportunities elsewhere. Those who had successfully migrated could not easily inform friends and family of the better conditions. Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch (1977, 195) argue that with little savings and the uncertain outcome of moving, they could not afford to invest in migrating. Hence, Logan speculates that the Great Migration was primarily of the first postbellum generation that was, in general, in good health and which featured much greater literacy rates. Robert Margo (1991) also demonstrates using data from the 1900 and later censuses that greater education is associated with a greater probability to migrate.
However, the arguments from the Great Migration literature are not sufficient to a priori rule out that the emigrant agent laws might have had an effect. The four states went to considerable trouble to bring them in and defend them against court challenges. And, as already highlighted, these laws were just one of a set of measures that restricted southern African Americans economically and politically, something that worsened over time (see for example, William Windom and Henry Blair 1919 and George Devlin 1989) . A specific example is the anti-enticement laws which prohibited an employer from offering higher wages to entice a worker away from another employer but there were other informal rules as well as straight out intimidation across the South.
5 That being said, Lisa FrehillRowe's (1993) study that analyzes the contribution of political and social conditions (focusing on migration to Kansas and Nebraska) fails to find any significant effects of these factors.
The final argument against finding large effects of emigration agent laws is that African Americans did not rely solely on emigrant agents to assist in their movement. For instance, African Americans in Georgia's Clarke County held several meetings to discuss emigrating (Holmes 1980, 443) . In Alabama, an organization of African Americans sent a member 5 See Cohen (1991, 32 and 35) and the 2010 paper by Suresh Naidu. Volume XXXVII, 2019 "to visit Kansas, and other parts of the West, for the purpose of examining that country and reporting back ... his views as to the expediency of removing thereto" (Windom and Blair 1919, 71) . Walter Fleming (1909) describes the role played by Pap Singleton who was described as the Moses of the exodus of the late 1870s. This is consistent with either the demand or supply factors identified in the preceding paragraphs as determining whether the emigrant agent laws were important.
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To initially analyze the effects of the emigrant agent laws across the four states, Table 2 shows the African-American migration rates across the four states between 1870 and 1900 derived from estimates compiled from the 1870 to 1900 Population Censuses. Except for African Americans in North Carolina the rates are inversely correlated with movements in the deflated cotton price (Ransom and Sutch 1977, Figure 9 .1).
This table offers, at best, qualified evidence in favor of the emigrant agent laws working as intended. After 1880, the decadal African American migration rate in Georgia is typically about one percentage point lower than that of Alabama. However, the gap was even greater before the emigrant agent law was introduced. And white migration in Georgia is typically several percentage points below that of Alabama which suggests state differences may be important. Similarly, although African American migration from South Carolina is about one percentage point lower than that in North Carolina, in the preceding decades the gap was also there, or even greater. However, there is no such difference in migration rate of whites from the Carolinas. This makes it less likely that state effects are driving this result.
As examining aggregate data does not provide a conclusion in the next section we discuss how we use a model of and data on individual data to provide more evidence.
Model, Data and Identification
In this section we discuss the model and the data as well as the assumptions required for identification. The data we use is two panels of African American and white men followed between 1870 and 1880 and between 1880 and 1900 in four states: Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. So the unit of observation is an individual who is observed in both years for each of the two periods. For reasons we present in the section on identification, separate models will be estimated for the two natural experiments, i.e. Georgia compared with Alabama and South Carolina compared with North Carolina. The Econometric Models As our historical analysis has identified two natural experiments, we mainly focus on the results from estimating two sets of difference-indifference equations. Each set includes data on African Americans in the states with and without the emigration laws before and after these laws took effect. The basic equation is:
where DInterstate is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the person migrates, and zero otherwise. Xi is a vector of personal characteristics such as age, marital status, and occupation and β is the vector of the associated parameters. We include two dummy variables as explanatory variables: Dlaw, and D1880. Dlaw equals one if the state has a permanent emigration agent law (Georgia and South Carolina). D1880 equals one if the observation is in the second period of our dataset. The parameters δ1 and δ2 capture the effects that distinguish the states and are constant over time, and the effects, common across states, that vary over time. δ3 captures the effect of the emigrant agent laws on African Americans i.e. the treatment effect. If the emigrant agent laws have the expected effect, this estimate should be significantly negative.
To analyze the effect of the emigrant agent laws on intrastate migration we estimate equation (3):
where DIntrastate is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the person moves intrastate and zero otherwise. θ3 is the treatment effect of emigrant agent laws on the intra-state migration decisions of African American men. If the emigrant agent laws have the expected effect, this is expected to be significantly positive. α0, α, and θ1 to θ2 have interpretations analogous to β0, β, and δ1 to δ2 in equation (2).
We estimate equations (2) and (3) using a linear probability model and a probit model. Following the approach of Patrick Puhani (2012) , the treatment effect for the probit is estimated as the marginal effect of the interaction dummy on δ3 or θ3 as applicable.
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To examine the robustness of the results from estimating equations (2) and (3) we estimate two additional sets of equations. First, we include data on white Americans in the four states so to estimate a triple difference specification as in equations (4) and (5) In this triple difference specification δ7 is the treatment effect of the emigrant agent laws. The parameters δ1 to δ3 capture the effects of race, state, and time that are constant across state and time, race and time, and race and state respectively. δ4 captures the difference in the propensity to migrate for African Americans in the treatment states that is constant over time. δ5 captures the difference in the propensity for African Americans to migrate during 1880 to 1900, compared with the earlier period, across states. Finally, δ6 captures any differences in the propensity to migrate in the treatment states between 1880 and 1900 for all individuals, black and white.
Secondly, we extend the triple difference-in-difference specifications to allow for different returns, by race, to literacy and different occupations by interacting the X variables with Daa. The triple difference specifications bring the advantage of drawing on more data to estimate, in particular, coefficients not specific by race. However, during the postbellum period in the South, the environment was very different for African Americans and whites and this also changed over time. This introduces an additional risk of mis-specification which leads us to treat this specification as exploring the robustness of the main results.
Data
We use data on males from the IPUMS data Linked Representative Samples for 1870-1880 and 1880-1900. The sample with which we estimate our models is restricted to men originating from Alabama, Georgia, North or South Carolina who were aged over 13 at the end of each sample period. In addition all men who were never in the labor force or for whom there is no migration status recorded are removed. This leaves a sample size of 3,710.
There are two potential concerns about the data. The first is that the way the IPUMS linked sample is constructed may result in an underrepresentation of African Americans. The IPUMS sample begins with the complete 1880 census and one per cent random samples from the 1870 and 1900 censuses. Individuals are then matched using data on age, name, race, sex, and birthplace. In North Carolina, whites make up 60 percent to 70 percent of the population and 73 percent of the sample. But in the other three states African Americans are typically 50-60 percent of the population but only 30-40 percent of the sample. Still, as we will demonstrate, the interstate migration patterns in our sample are largely similar in nature to those at the aggregate level.
A second issue with the data is that all data are reported only for census years, which do not automatically line up with the treatment dates. The most serious problem comes from having to use 1880 to 1900 instead of 1890 to 1900 because of the missing 1890 census schedules. 6 This means for South Carolina, that half of the period includes the period before the emigrant agent law was passed. A less serious issue arises for Alabama and Georgia both of which have emigrant agent laws from around 1877 to 1880 during the pre-treatment period. This will be ameliorated to the extent that it takes time for agents to find out and respond to a change in the law.
Dependent Variable
We use the variable Migrant in the IPUMS linked dataset as our dependent variable. It is described in Table 3 . The five categories in the dataset are reduced to three. The first and second categories, "same county, same boundary" and "same county, boundaries changed", are combined to form the non-migrant group. The 93 observations that are in the third group are omitted leaving 3617 observations as the final sample size. The fourth group is described as intrastate migrants and the fifth group is described as interstate migrants. It is important to note that as the observations are linked between 1870 and 1880 and between 1880 and 1900 we only observe the origin and ultimate destination of each individual. Table 4 reports a selection of migration rates in the sample by state, period and race.
The top half of Table 4 reveals differences in inter-state migration rates that provide qualified support for emigrant agent laws having their intended type effects. Between 1880 and 1900, interstate migration rates are lower in Georgia than in Alabama, though the difference is not large, and they are also lower in South Carolina than in North Carolina. However, these differences are present before the emigrant agent laws were introduced, which suggests more detailed analysis is required.
Comparing the migration rates in Table 4 with those estimated from aggregate data in Table 2 under the columns titled 1870-1880 and 1880-1900 reveals that the migration rates in the sample tend to be much higher than those in the aggregate data. This could be due in part to the sample being of men of at least 14 years of age who, particularly when younger and single, are more likely to be migrating for work, but only make up Volume XXXVII, 2019 between 54 and 60 percent of African American males in these states in 1880 and 1900. The fact we get a deviation in the same direction suggests that it is more likely to be something systematically different about male migration compared with the total rather than sampling error. Georgia -Alabama South Carolina -North Carolina Difference-in-Difference (African Americans):
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Population (Table 2) 0.027 -0.048 Sample (Table 4) 0.08 -0.08 Triple Differences: Population (Table 2) 0.016 -0.033 Sample (Table 4) 0.07 -0.1
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses
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In the last panel we compare the sample difference-in-differences in migration rates for African Americans with the population values across the two sets of states. We also calculate the triple differences (effectively the difference-in-difference for African Americans less the difference-indifference for whites for each set of treatment and control states). The sample differences have the same signs as the population ones but are much larger. The positive result for Georgia versus Alabama suggests that if there was an effect of emigrant agents, it has been swamped by other factors leading to relatively greater African American migration from Georgia. The negative result for South Carolina versus North Carolina is more consistent with expectations.
That being said, the sample patterns across each set of states mainly resemble the population ones. The change for Georgia over time is about right but not that for Alabama. So any comparison over time for these states has to be treated with caution. For North and South Carolina the relative differences across states and over time are in the expected direction. It is worth noting though that a significant portion of the difference in outcomes between North and South Carolina occurred before South Carolina brought in the emigrant agent law. Finally, when we perform the econometric analysis we condition on a set of potential determinants which may explain some of the differences between the aggregate and the sample.
Personal Characteristics
We choose a set of personal characteristics, as summarized in Table  5 , similar to those used in recent work analysing migration decisions in the nineteenth century US (for example, Logan 2009; James Stewart 2012; Laura Salisbury 2014). All or most of these papers control for age, literacy, marital status, occupation, and whether an individual lives in an urban area or not. We also control for family size, as does Stewart (2012) . All explanatory variables are observed in both 1880 and 1900. We use the 1900 value, except for Large City for which we use the 1880 version, to capture the effect of starting in a city. The reason for this is that migration is a forward looking decision so, for example, it is the prospective occupation that is relevant rather than the current occupation. Table 6 reports the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables. For African American men, they are reported by period whereas sample averages are reported for white men. In general, there are a lot more observations for white men compared with African American men. Average age, family size, number of children, and occupational characteristics are fairly similar across the four states and over time for African Americans-the linking process may have contributed to this. For most variables there are not substantial differences across racial groups with illiteracy being the main exception. African Americans have higher illiteracy rates (between 40 percent and 60 percent on average across the states and across the years though there is a decline between the two periods). The similarity of the average values across the states and, for those that do move over time, the similar movements, is promising for identifying the effects of the emigrant agent laws.
Identification
In order for the estimates of the parameters on the interaction terms in equation (2) and (3), δ3 and θ3, and triple interaction terms in equations (4) and (5), δ7 and θ7, to capture the treatment effects, there must be nothing left in the relevant error terms correlated with these variables.
The first stage of this argument is that emigrant agent laws effectively applied only to African Americans and that this law was effectively assigned randomly in the states in the sample. As we discussed earlier, although these acts were not expressed in racial terms, emigrant agents largely aimed at recruiting African Americans and so the laws would have solely affected them. We treat the emigrant agent law as an exogenous variable because, as discussed earlier, there is no obvious reason why when deciding on an appeal against the laws the courts in the control states overturned the emigrant agent laws as unconstitutional whereas the court in Georgia did not, and that the control states reinstated emigrant laws once their constitutionality was confirmed.
For equations (2) and (3) we need there to be no unobserved shocks that affect the likelihood of migration by African Americans in the state with the emigration agent law distinctly from the comparison state. We argue this in three stages. First, the individual differences are controlled for by all the usual determinants of individual migration decisions. Secondly, any longstanding differences across the states in economic activities or political climate will be controlled for by the state dummies. Finally, any common fluctuations such as in macroeconomic conditions will be controlled for by the time dummy.
We run separate regressions for each pair of treatment and control states. This is for two reasons. First, all things being equal, we expect to estimate greater differences between interstate migration rates the longer the emigration agent laws are in place. This implies a greater difference between Georgia and Alabama than between North and South Carolina.
Second, our arguments as to the randomness of assignment of treatment apply within pairs of states, not across pairs of states. For example, a random factor may have determined why Georgia had a permanent emigration agent law in 1880 and Alabama did not. But there is not a clear exogenous reason as to why the Carolinas introduced their emigration agent laws ten years later. The different timing is consistent with a combination of different pressures from external migration and different political environments. Evidence presented earlier demonstrates that there was interstate migration from North Carolina in the mid to late 1870s but the political environment meant an emigrant agent law was not passed. So there may have been unobservable factors affecting individual migration decisions in the Carolinas, compared with Georgia and Alabama, which may be correlated with the interaction term. By only comparing states that introduce emigrant laws at the same time, the time dummies effectively control for other changes in the environment that could have also encouraged migration. For the triple difference specification, which includes data on white residents, identification requires that there are no other shocks that affected African Americans relative to whites in the treatment states in the treatment period compared with the other states and in other periods. The most plausible contender for such a shock is an economic one. There are two sets of arguments why this is unlikely to be a problem. First, as well as controlling for the standard determinants of migration we also control for state effects that differ by race and over time and include occupational dummies which will be correlated with shocks that might hit the two races differently. To see how this works, consider a change in commodity prices that affect a state. If the two races work in similar occupations in similar industries, triple differencing removes this influence. But white men were somewhat more likely to work in clerical, managerial, and professional occupations and African Americans were more likely to work in craft and unskilled occupations. By including dummies controlling for occupational differences we control, to some extent, for differences in the way economic shocks might have affected men from the two races. 
Results
The marginal effects on the personal characteristics from the estimates of the linear probability models, with robust standard errors, are reported in Table 7 . The marginal effects from the probit models are typically similar in size and significance and so are not reported. 7 In addition, the estimates of the treatment effect from both the linear probabilities and probit models are also reported. The share of negative probabilities predicted by the linear probability model is typically below five percent. For the one case this does not apply it is still less than twenty per cent, so we proceed with these results. We first consider the marginal effects of the personal characteristics to determine if the reduced form migration equation is plausibly controlling for these determinants of the migration decision.
The signs of the marginal effects of the personal characteristics are largely similar across states though they may have different relationships with different types of migration. The likelihood of interstate migration increases with age whereas the likelihood of intrastate migration declines with age (though the effect is only significant in the Carolinas). Intuitively, a greater family reduces the likelihood of intra-state migration in Alabama and Georgia and inter-state migration in the Carolinas. In the Carolinas, being married reduces the likelihood of inter-state migration, but increases the likelihood of intra-state migration. These results, from within the sample, are also supportive of our argument that the reason for the larger migration rates in our sample compared with the population migration rates is its restriction to working age men.
Also, consistent with the arguments in Collins (1997) and results obtained by Logan (2009) , being illiterate tends to increase the likelihood intrastate migration (although the effect is only significant for Georgia and Alabama) and, plausibly, reduces the likelihood of inter-state migration (though the effect is not statistically significant). Starting from a city has a positive significant effect on interstate migration, as noted by Collins (1997) but the opposite effect occurs for the Carolinas.
None of the treatment effects are statistically significantly different from zero. For Alabama and Georgia the signs and sizes are similar across the two models and to the difference in difference calculated from the raw data. For the Carolinas, the size of the treatment effect from the linear probability is also similar to that in the raw data, though its p-value is just 0.22. The marginal effect from the probit model is much smaller. It is the only marginal effect from the probit that is substantially different to that from the linear probability model.
For intrastate migration, the emigrant agent laws are also reported to not have a significant effect, and the size of both effects are smaller than those for interstate migration. There are several possible explanations for these results. The first is that the laws were ineffective because of the reluctance of northern employers to hire African Americans relative to European immigrants (Collins, 1997) and the illiteracy and poor health of southern African Americans (Logan, 2009 ) meant African Americans did not respond on a large scale to the agents. Alternatively it may be the case that the other efforts in place across all the states to prevent large scale emigration, such as anti-enticement laws, intimidation and informal rules, are sufficiently effective to disguise the marginal effect of the emigrant agent laws to such a degree that they cannot be detected econometrically.
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Robustness of the results.
We have already demonstrated that our main results are largely robust to varying the estimation technique from linear probability to probit. In Table 8 we report the results of estimating the triple-difference specifications of equations (4) and (5). The estimates of the treatment effects are fairly similar to those from the difference-in-difference specification for all cases except one. For intrastate migration for Georgia and Alabama, the linear probability model returns a negative effect on intrastate migration which is statistically significantly different from zero at five percent. This must either reflect the effect of some state-specific economic shock or regulation relating to African Americans during this period. The estimates of the marginal effects for the personal characteristics typically have the same signs and are more likely to be statistically significantly different from zero. For example, an increase in family size significantly reduces the likelihood of migrating intra-or interstate for both sets of states. Illiteracy statistically significantly increases the likelihood of intrastate migration for both sets of states and now significantly reduces the likelihood of interstate migration in the Carolinas, strengthening the support for the results of Logan (2009) .
Being in a craft occupation significantly increases interstate migration in both sets of states and intrastate migration in Georgia and Alabama whereas in the smaller sample, all of these effects are not significantly different zero. This result is consistent with the argument of Collins (1997) that at least some migrants had some industry experience.
Finally, note, that for all cases except for intrastate migration in the Carolinas, allowing for different coefficients for African Americans did not significantly improve the performance of the regression. And in the later case it had no material effect on the estimates of the treatment effects.
Conclusion
After the Civil War a new occupation surfaced in the South, that of the emigrant agent. Planters, railroad companies, and mining companies contracted with emigrant agents to hire African American workers on their behalf. Several cases in the literature suggest emigrant agents successfully recruited African American workers for their clients.
Their success angered many in the white communities from which African Americans had been recruited. Planters, who no longer had control over a captive labor force after the Civil War and whose interests were most adversely affected by emigrant agent activities, lobbied their state governments to take action against emigrant agents. The receptive governments in four states, Alabama, Georgia, North and South Carolina responded by enacting legislation intended to deter emigrant agents from operating in their states. The emigrant agents appealed against the laws. In Georgia the appeals were unsuccessful, whereas in Alabama and North Carolina they were successful enabling the emigrant agents to operate for Note: Regression results for estimating equations (4) and (5). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The average treatment effect for the probit is calculated for the treated sub-sample.
Note: F-test on adding different coefficients for African Americans is only for the linear probability specifications. The Chi-squared tests for the probits are all statistically insignificant.
about 20 years, until 1903, when a Supreme Court decision finally established the constitutionality of the emigrant agent laws. The different outcomes of the court cases across Georgia, Alabama and North Carolina create a set of natural experiments with which to provide the first estimates of the effect of the emigrant agent laws on migration and to assess whether they contributed to the delay in the Great Migration out of the South. This explanation complements earlier works on the delay to the Great Migration which focus on changes in demand and supply conditions (Vedder et al. 1986 , Collins 1997 , and Logan 2009 ). We estimate a migration model on linked IPUMS data on males between 1870 and 1880 and between 1880 and 1900. We find that the emigrant agent laws had no significant negative effect on migration by African Americans from Georgia and South Carolina relative to Alabama and North Carolina. This is consistent with the demand and supply conditions making large scale migration uneconomic or other laws effectively deterring migration.
Two possibilities for future research are to explore two possible effects of the emigration agent laws that cannot be analyzed using the framework and data used in this paper. First, it is possible that the emigrant agents laws might have deterred emigrant agents from operating on a scale that might result in Alabama and North Carolina reintroduce them more effectively. This would probably require data from a broader set of states though this brings risks of the results being affected by other unobservable differences.
Second, it is possible that although emigrant agent laws were largely ineffective in the late 19 th century, they may have temporarily delayed the Great Migration in the early years of the 20 th century for two reasons. First, as highlighted by Logan (2009) , younger African Americans became better equipped to migrate by the first decade of the 20 th century. Second, the general environment for African-Americans became worse during this period with the diffusion of the Jim Crow laws. This would reconcile the tension between our results and the rapid reintroduction of the laws in 1903 by Alabama and North Carolina after the High Court ruled such laws constitutional. The impact, though, was at most temporary as the Great Migration was well underway within the next decade, irrespective of emigrant agents. Determining the validity of this argument remains a task for future research.
